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Enactivism: A Normative Way Out
From Ontological Dilemmas
Manuel de Pinedo García*
Departamento de Filosofía I, Universidad de Granada, Granada, Spain
Two important issues of recent discussion in the philosophy of biology and of the
cognitive sciences have been the ontological status of living, cognitive agents and
whether cognition and action have a normative character per se. In this paper I will
explore the following conditional in relation with both the notion of affordance and
the idea of the living as self-creation: if we recognize the need to use normative
vocabulary to make sense of life in general, we are better off avoiding taking sides
on the ontological discussion between eliminativists, reductionists and emergentists.
Looking at life through normative lenses is, at the very least, in tension with any kind of
realism that aims at prediction and control. I will argue that this is so for two separate
reasons. On the one hand, understanding the realm of biology in purely factualist, realist
terms means to dispossess it of its dignity: there is more to life than something that
we simply aim to manipulate to our own material convenience. On the other hand, a
descriptivist view that is committed to the existence of biological and mental facts that
are fully independent of our understanding of nature may be an invitation to make our
ethical and normative judgments dependent on the discovery of such alleged facts,
something I diagnose as a form of representationalism. This runs counter what I take
to be a central democratic ideal: while there are experts whose opinion could be
considered the last word on purely factual matters, where value is concerned, there
are no technocratic experts above the rest of us. I will rely on the ideas of some
central figures of early analytic philosophy that, perhaps due to the reductionistic and
eliminativist tendencies of contemporary philosophy of mind, have not been sufficiently
discussed within post-cognitivist debates.
Keywords: enactivism, ecological psychology, affordances, normativity, dispositionalism, analytic philosophy,
representationalism, agency
INTRODUCTION
I will begin by distinguishing between two forms of antirepresentationalism, one regarding
cognition and the other regarding language. I will then claim that, even after having presented
a serious challenge and alternatives to the former, there can be a residual form of linguistic
representationalism behind the thought that we are in the business of describing facts and referring
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to free-standing properties when we speak of affordances or
give normative explanations of agency (section “Ontological
Approaches to Affordances and Normativity”). In section
“Non-descriptivism and Rule-Following” I will review some
alternatives to descriptivism that draw from early and recent
analytic philosophy: some vocabularies, normative, evaluative,
intentional, are fundamental for our understanding of nature
but they do not bring commitments to additional entities. I
will then explore how these ideas apply to the possibility of
non-social normativity (section “Non-social Normativity”) and
to the relationship between ontological and normative/ethical
perspectives on life, cognition and agency (section “Ontology
and Ethics”). My central target is to free up a space after
exposing three apparent ontological dilemmas as leading to
dead ends: either affordances are intrinsic properties or there
is no distinction between describing and evaluating (section
“Ontological Approaches to Affordances and Normativity”);
either the mind has a causal role in nature or we should abandon
our mental vocabulary; and (section “Non-descriptivism and
Rule-Following”) either values and norms exist independently
of evaluative practices or they are a mere projection from a
provisional stance (section “Ontology and Ethics”).
The present special issue deals with the convergence and
complementarity between enactivism and ecological psychology.
This is a refreshing and much needed alternative to one common
approach to the relationship between both research programs,
namely trying to highlight the alleged superiority of one over
the other regarding, say, learning, the role of the agent, the role
of the environment or the possibility of giving explanations that
scale up to linguistic or social phenomena (Varela et al., 1991;
Flament-Fultot et al., 2016; Di Paolo et al., 2017). The topic can
be an invitation for an alternative take on the issue, which I
won’t pursue, but I assume that is both feasible and desirable:
to embark on an ecumenical collaboration between ecological
psychology and enactivism, putting together the strengths of one
and the other for the major glory of a positive alternative to
representationalism and cognitivism (Heras-Escribano, 2019a).
However, I think that there is a less explored perspective
regarding the convergence of both traditions, one that precisely
aims at deepening the antirepresentionalist character of the new
paradigm by warning against a common danger that lies ahead, in
slightly different forms, for enactivism and ecological psychology,
the danger of conflating normative questions with ontological,
descriptive ones.
To do so I’ll draw on a philosophical tradition, analytic
philosophy, which is often ignored in the post-cognitivist
discussions in favor of phenomenology, perhaps because many of
its main representatives in the second half of the last century have
embraced physicalist or functionalist agendas in the philosophy
of mind. However, I think that such agendas are the result of
deliberately misunderstanding or plainly ignoring the ideas of
analytic philosophers from the previous generation. In which
way can a philosophical tradition centered on conceptual analysis
often performed without much attention to empirical issues
illuminate debates regarding, as in our case, the relation between
ecological and enactive approaches to cognition? I think that,
at the very least, some methodological clarity may be obtained
when thinking about some questions that have been a source of
perplexity for philosophy through the centuries—in the case at
hand, questions such as “what is life” or “what is mind” or “what
is agency”—in terms of the kind of thing that do we do when we
say that something is alive or minded or an agent. The questions
may become more tractable as well as less abstract and more
related to practice.
I can be illuminating to call attention to the fact that the two
above-mentioned philosophical strands, phenomenology and
analytic heterodox, together with pragmatism, constitute the core
of Rorty (1979). The reason I believe it is important to briefly go
back to Rorty is that his opposition to representationalism has
two sides that are not always distinguished, a cognitive/epistemic
one and a linguistic one: we can pursue a conception of the
mind with no representations mediating between the cognitive
agent and the world and still retain the idea that the main
function of language is to represent reality, to describe facts,
objects and properties. The mirror of nature that Rorty wants
to expel from philosophy is both the mind as a mirror and
language as a mirror. While a lot of attention has been
paid to the problems of representational understandings of
the mind within the cognitive sciences, and both ecological
psychology and enactivism can be seen as deeply articulated
positive non-representational alternatives (both avoiding the
idea that cognition is computation over internal or external
representations), antirepresentationalist views of language have
tended to remain within the confines of traditional, purely
conceptual analytic philosophy. Post-cognitivism can benefit
from an emphasis on the idea that some, perhaps most, of our
linguistic practices don’t aim to describe a reality that is there
anyway but to take an evaluative stance. To think of affordances
as intrinsic properties of things that exist independently of
the agents that could perceive and take advantage of them
and to think of normativity as a describable feature of




As I mentioned above, I am highly optimistic regarding the
complementation between ecological psychology and enactivism
toward the common project of replacing a representationalist,
intellectualist and computationalist conception of life and
cognition. I think that there would be a lot to be gained if
the different emphases on the meaning-making and evaluative
character of cognitive agents, on the one hand, and on the
direct perception of information in the environment that is
relevant for the agent, on the other, are just that, a difference of
emphasis. The plea that I hope to make for keeping ontology and
normativity apart is grounded on the rejection of: (1) the realist
idea that values—meanings, relevancies, affordances—could be
individuated without any reference to practices of evaluation
(either those of the agent that finds them of value or our own
normative explanations of such interactions) and (2) what we
could call a purely projectivist understanding of normativity,
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where meanings and values are mere shadows of agents’ sense-
making processes or, worse, just a convenient way for us to
explain their behavior.
I will claim that dispositionalist factualism or realism
regarding affordances (1, above) and non-social descriptivism
regarding life (2, above) are two instances of the same
problematic approach and that we can still understand
affordances relationally and dispositionally, and all forms of
life in terms of a basic, non-social, sense of normativity
after giving up factualism and descriptivism. Factualism and
descriptivism are the metaphysical and the conceptual side of the
same coin. Following the usage in contemporary expressivism,
being descriptivist about an area of discourse (say, discourse
about ethics or life or knowledge) is to assume that the main
purpose of the discourse is to describe some feature of reality.
Descriptivism goes hand in hand with factualism, according to
which our normative talk is made true by independent facts
and it ultimately refers to entities such as objects, properties
or relations that can be scientifically described (Chrisman,
2007; Yalcin, 2011; at some points in the paper I will use
“realism” instead of “factualism,” for instance when I discuss
dispositionalism or moral realism, because the former term
is more established in those debates). Descriptivism is closely
related to representationalism, although they are not necessarily
the same thesis. Antirepresentationalism can be global or
local: we can claim that language in general should not be
understood as aiming to represent facts or we can reject that
the purpose of some specific vocabularies is to refer to entities.
Local antirepresenationalism about a vocabulary amounts to
antidescriptivism regarding that vocabulary (Brandom, 1994;
Price, 2011). Although I sympathize with both ways to oppose
representationalism, it is the local, descriptivist variety the one
that I will mainly take issue with in the rest of the paper
(Heras-Escribano and Pinedo García, 2018).
In order to show the ineliminability of our dispositional and
normative vocabularies without acquiring dubious ontological
commitments, I need to retract some of my previous statements
regarding both the non-normative character of affordances and
the inconsistency of having a normative take regarding non-
social animals and plants (both made in conjunction with one
of the editors of this issue: see Heras-Escribano et al., 2015;
Heras-Escribano and Pinedo García, 2016). The strategy is to
move away from the idea that we generously grant an evaluative
dignity to some living creatures by finding out “facts” about
them. Complex, adaptive, evolutionary behavior can only be
made sense of in relational, agential and normative terms, not
because of the possession of this or that inner structure (as much
contemporary representationalism would have it), but because
recognizing something as an agent capable of behaving is already
acquiring a set of essentially normative commitments regarding
what the agent should do and what we should expect from the
agent, as well as what would be better or worse for the agent to
find in its environment.
Assuming that there is a difference between descriptive and
normative uses of language, I’d like to explore what I take to be
a dilemma for cognitive science and for enactivism. On the one
hand, if we apply recent debates in metaphysics to the cognitive
sciences, we can say that some popular ontological approaches to
affordances within ecological psychology have embraced forms
of dispositional realism or factualism (Turvey, 1992). Realism
regarding dispositions and, in particular, regarding affordances,
has some unwelcome metaphysical consequences: in order to
individuate affordances, we may need to commit to the existence
of dubious entities (Tugby, 2013). In a nutshell, the difficulty is
this: in order to say that an object possesses a specific affordance
we cannot wait for it to manifest, because that would not
account for its potential aspect and because there are affordances
and dispositions that disappear when they manifest (an acorn
is edible for a pig as long as it has not been already eaten,
an artifact is explosive until it explodes) (for an exhaustive
characterization, see Martin, 2008). What can we appeal to for
their individuation? Given that we cannot individuate them in
terms of their particular manifestations because, as we have said,
many affordances never manifest (are never taken advantage of),
we could do so in terms of their prototypical manifestation (being
eaten by a pig, exploding). But we would like to say that the
acorn is edible or the material is explosive even if none has
been eaten or has exploded before, in which case we would need
to individuate the property in terms of something which not
only is a type, rather than a particular token, but which need
not have ever actually manifested. Tugby (2013) defends that
the best candidates are Platonic universals, i.e., universals that
exist independently of whether they have ever been instantiated
or not. This is hard to swallow from a naturalistic point of
view [see Heras-Escribano (2017) for an exploration of a Rylean
conception of disposition and Heras-Escribano (2019b) for an
application to affordances; I will come back to this below].
The most obvious alternative (Chemero, 2009) is to claim
that our talk of affordances has an intrinsic normative character.
Here, the ecologist would be joining forces with some forms of
enactivism that take normative evaluation to be adequate for any
living being, whether social or not (Barandiaran et al., 2009).
This other horn of the dilemma runs a two-fold risk: on the
one hand, it is close to local representationalism (descriptivism)
regarding normative language: even our evaluations have as their
purpose referring to entities and describing facts about them.
On the other, it needs to answer to the accusation of embracing
a private model of rule-following (Wittgenstein, 1953; Kripke,
1982; Heras-Escribano et al., 2015; Heras-Escribano and Pinedo
García, 2016): for an agent to be normatively assessed it needs
to distinguish between what is correct and what it merely seems
correct to it and this capacity may only be acquired by means
of social sanctions and corrections. To think of affordances as
intrinsic properties of things that exist independently of the
agents that could perceive and take advantage of them and
to think of normativity as a describable feature of the pair
agent/environment may both invite the threatening thought that
values are determined by independently intelligible facts (e.g.,
intrinsic properties of things, measurable inner forces of agents).
Of course, we could try to avoid the dilemma by reducing
the demands for normative evaluation (Kiverstein and Rietveld,
2018): placing an organism within a normative network would be
just a question of saying that some things were better and some
worse for it. While this kind of proposal respects the distinction
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between describing and evaluating, it seems very hard to see in
what sense it allows to distinguish between living and non-living
entities. To see something as living, as an agent, as a subject
of experience and behavior, is to take an ethical, rather than
ontological stance, is to recognize a dignity beyond anything
merely factual, as we will see in section 5. Gibsonians and neo-
Gibsonians are right to insist that perception and cognition are
basically active and relational. Enactivists are right to insist that
to understand the living we need evaluative vocabulary. But
precisely because of that, I will argue, their project should not be
seen as merely discovering facts and describing processes.
NON-DESCRIPTIVISM AND
RULE-FOLLOWING
By establishing a contrast between normativity and ontology I
mean to highlight what I take to be a false dilemma that has
pervaded much of the discussion regarding mind and cognition.
The dilemma is this: either the mind has a causal role in nature,
explainable in lawful terms, or we must sooner or later eliminate
all uses of mental (cognitive, agential, intentional. . . ) vocabulary
and replace them by the vocabularies of bona fide natural
sciences. If the only alternative to placing the mind causally in the
world is to think of it as a mere epiphenomenon, we would seem
not to have moved away too far from Descartes’ predicament.
What makes the dilemma seem inescapable is a Cartesian premise
shared by both horns: the only thing that we do when we speak is
to refer to things (to substances, to res), to describe them in order
to predict their behavior and control it.
So what do we mean when we say that we do different things
than describing facts when we speak about the world? What
else do we do other than placing entities in a nomological,
spatiotemporal framework? Here is Sellars speaking about
knowledge: “The essential point is that in characterizing an
episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving an
empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in
the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify
what one says” (Sellars, 1956, §36). What Sellars opposes is the
idea that the epistemic can be analyzed in terms of non-epistemic
facts, whether these facts are public or private, phenomenal or
behavioral. Sellars will ultimately opt for an early version of
eliminativism: given that normative spheres cannot be reduced
to scientific discourse, and given that, according to him, the
scientific image and the normative/manifest image compete as
complete pictures of the world, we will have to eventually discard
the later (Sellars, 1962).
This, however, is not the only lesson that we can take from
the irreducibility of our normative vocabulary. We can also
accept that we do not display the same attitude regarding the
epistemic, the cognitive or even the biological than the one
we take toward the merely physical. Think of Moore’s open-
question argument, which he presents for ethical vocabulary but
we could extend to every discourse that recognizes meanings
and differential valences: someone may argue that when we say
that something is good what we say is that it is pleasurable
(or useful or desirable or preferred by the gods or whatever),
but it will always make sense to ask “OK, it is pleasurable,
but is it good?” while it makes no sense to ask “OK, it is
good, but is it good?”. Even if we embraced a fully hedonistic
ethics and considered that “good” refers to pleasure, we cannot
conclude that both words mean the same (Moore, 1903, §13).
But even someone with recalcitrant reductionist intuitions needs
to recognize that different things are at issue when we disagree
about something being pleasurable and when we disagree about
something being good. The second disagreement is intrinsically
connected with what to do, with how to live one’s life, the first
isn’t (Gibbard, 2012: 42–46; Moore, 1903, § 11).
So, if we, unlike Moore, refuse to populate the world with
non-natural entities such as goodness (i.e., if we insist on having
a naturalistic ontology), we can still retain his conceptual non-
naturalism: some of our concepts, those with normative force, are
not used to refer to properties but to make intelligible the actual
and potential actions of the agents that we evaluate by using those
concepts (some of the most developed versions of this idea can
be found in contemporary semantic expressivism; see Frápolli
and Villanueva, 2012; Gibbard, 2012). Again, the idea is not that
our explanatory practices themselves are subject to normative
assessment, as correct, illuminating, relevant, elegant and so on,
but that normativity is constitutive of the very subject matter of
our explanations when it comes to agency. The lesson from these
arguments is that concepts and properties are not the same: on
the one hand, some concepts have a high contextual variation
with respect to the properties that fall into their extension (think
of “tall” or “flat”) and, on the other, there can be several concepts
of the same property, some aiming at descriptively situating it
within a causal network, some aiming at making salient its value
for an agent. Saying that something is a better environment for a
frog is different from saying that it contains lots of such and such
protein, even if what makes the environment better is precisely
the presence of the protein.
Let’s come back briefly to the problems of an ontological
approach to affordances, one according to which affordances
exist over and above the informational flows between agent and
environment and the categorical properties of things. Trying to
argue that affordances are intrinsic, dispositional properties of
things leads to serious metaphysical difficulties, perhaps even to a
commitment to Platonic universals. But this does not mean that
we should abandon the idea that affordances are dispositions.
We could follow Ryle’s elucidation of the explanatory power of
dispositional vocabulary while, like him, avoiding the temptation
of thinking that dispositions are occult forces that cause their
manifestations. “There still survives the preposterous assumption
that every true or false statement either asserts or denies that
a mentioned object or set of objects possesses a specified
attribute” (Ryle, 1949: 104; see also Heras-Escribano, 2017).
Our dispositional explanations, like explanations that appeal to
general laws, can be true or false not because they refer to
extra entities (a causal connection, an unobservable tendency),
but because they allow us to infer some factual statements
from other causal statements (they are what Ryle calls inference
tickets). If a thing is explosive it will explode in such and
such circumstances. Ryle is particularly interested in applying
this way of understanding dispositions to mental states such
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as beliefs in order to, among other things, reject Cartesian or
representationalist understandings of the mind. My suggestion is
that we fit affordances within this framework.
But, is there an evaluative, normative element involved,
besides the dispositional one, when we explain behavior in
terms of affordances? I think that the best way to tackle this
question is in conjunction with the possibility, insisted upon by
some forms of enactivism, of thinking of agency in normative
terms even in the case of non-social agents. Wittgenstein
(1953), §§185–243), considered by some of the most influential
contemporary philosophers to be the starting point of recent
focus on normativity (Kripke, 1982; McDowell, 1984; Brandom,
1994), is often interpreted as follows. If, in order to judge whether
an agent has acted correctly or incorrectly according to a rule, we
must interpret the rule so as to ascertain that the action is or is
not an instance of what the rule calls for, then there will be no
end to the chain of interpretations and reinterpretations of the
rule and there will always be interpretations of the rule that take
the action to be correct and others that take it to be incorrect.
As long as we cannot ground our interpretation on some facts
which, themselves, are interpretation-free, there is no final saying
regarding rule-following.
One of Wittgenstein’s favorite examples is a child learning how
to add. After some time going through examples, the teacher
asks her “How much is 1000 plus 2.” The child answers “1004”
and, in response to the teacher’s protestations, argues that she
has done like before. “Wasn’t I supposed to add 2 extra units
until 1000, 4 extra units until 10000 and so on?” This could
be the beginning of an endless stubborn discussion if the pupil
decided to reinterpret each word at her convenience. She may
claim to understand “count” such that it works one way until
1000 and a different one after that, for instance. Can we ever
stop interpreting? Wittgenstein seems to believe that we can: we
can appeal to social practices, to learning, to training, to routines
and customs, to being corrected by others with reinforcements
and punishments of many sorts. According to the standard way
of understanding Wittgenstein’s appeal to such social, public
phenomena, for something to count as normative it must be
placed in the context of the interaction between agents. I act
correctly (regarding some norm) if I act as others do. The child in
the example is making a mistake, not because she is offering the
wrong interpretation of the rule, but because she is not following
the socially established mathematical practices. Communities not
only train us to behave as others do, but they also provide the
necessary gap between it merely seeming to me that I am right
and my actually being right.
If this were correct, it would make no sense to evaluate
normatively the behavior of non-social agents or even the
behavior of social agents when they are isolated from all
communities of rule followers. The idea would be that thinking
of an agent as devising and following its own rules would
immediately lead to the vicious regress of interpretations:
anything the agent did could fit its own rule according to
some interpretation. To institute a rule and to follow it you
need more than one individual (“it takes two to err”). This has
been a conclusion that many, including myself, have embraced.
However, now I believe this is not the only way to think
of normativity nor the only way to understand Wittgenstein’s
profound teachings in this sphere. Let me briefly introduce one
of the usual suspects in this discussion, Robinson Crusoe. Crusoe
once belonged to a (rather strict) community and he probably
learned the hard way to distinguish between what merely seemed
right to him from what it was considered to be right by the
community. But, surely, he could still make plans and take
resolutions and organize in many ways his solitary life on the
island. There not being anyone around to keep him honest, could
we say that he is actually following rules, that his behavior is
opened to normative evaluation, his own evaluation, to start
with? It seems obvious that the answer should be yes: at the very
least, we could say that he has interiorized the possibility of being
wrong and that would allow him to self-correct. In fact, you don’t
need to be Crusoe to make up rules and to follow them. We often
make decisions concerning timetables or beer consumption and
manage to follow them (or fail to manage, but still realize that
we are not following them) without anyone checking on us. Is
the role of a community just to introduce us to the possibility
of error?
There is a further, potential role the community can play
and that may open up the space that we need, not for private
rule-following, but for rule-following by non-social agents. The
thought would be this: Wittgenstein’s target is the idea of a rule
that is followed privately, that is, a rule that may only be followed
by one agent. But for something to be a rule and for an action
to be in accordance with it, it is sufficient that a similarly placed
agent may act in a similar way to advance toward its goals. The
rejection of, say, the intelligibility of a language that only I could
understand (for instance, a language to refer to my sensations or
my private memories) does not entail that an agent is incapable
of using strategies that are fully original to itself. For this reason, I
think that my previous criticism of some enactivists’ discussions
of normativity with respect to bacteria and other non-social
creatures was misplaced (see Heras-Escribano et al., 2015).
NON-SOCIAL NORMATIVITY
Situated, unreflective and primitive or naive normativity are
usually characterized in terms of social or communal practices
or customs (see, for instance, Dreyfus, 2005; McDowell,
2007; Heras-Escribano, 2019b; Andrews, 2020). Normative
considerations, whether explicit or implicit, put forward by
Wittgenstein (1953) and Ryle (1949) or authors in the
phenomenological tradition are linked to practice, to know-
how, to bodily action but almost systematically in relation to
institutions, to socially established practices. However, we could
also find discussions that insist on the continuity between life
and cognition where being a social creature is not a condition of
possibility for the legitimate use of normative explanations (for
instance, Barandiaran and Egbert, 2013; Di Paolo et al., 2017,
2018)1. There are two paths to the acceptance of the possibility
1An obvious exception is radical enactivism, a position that is informed by
the early analytic ideas presented in this paper and which mostly avoids
approaching agency and cognition from a descriptive and ontological perspective
(see Hutto and Myin, 2012).
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of attributing normative features to non-social agents. One of
them is to commit to the descriptivism or factualism that I am
recommending against in this paper. The other is to stress the
link between being a normative agent and being recognizable as
such. This is the main point of this paper and it is important
to explicitly avoid a certain reading of the insistence on the
role of attribution, both regarding enactivism’s discussions of
normativity and with respect to normative and dispositional
approaches to affordances, a reading that views normativity as a
useful or convenient fiction, the stance or pretense of looking at
parts of the world “as if ” they could act purposely and to do so
better or worse. To be an agent is to evaluate the environment,
to recognize opportunities, dangers and resistances, to find sense
in the world and to make sense of it. To understand something
as an agent is also to evaluate its behavior. But neither in
the first case nor in the second the agential and normative
elements are a projection from the agent to the world or from
the attributor to the agent. And yet, I claim that there is a
dependence between meaning and meaning-making practices
and also between normativity and attributions of normativity.
What kind of dependence?
Let me go back to the idea of a private model of rule-
following: the possibility of an isolated agent navigating its
own normative field is a powerful idea, but one that needs the
background of other potential agents either acting similarly or
making normative sense of its behavior. I take this to be the real
revolution behind any form of antirepresentationalism, including
enactivism and ecological psychology: to show the absurdity of
any project that makes it intelligible to offer, from the outside,
so to speak, a complete, causal description of a universe with
cognition and life in it2. The revolution will only be complete
when both faces of representationalism are discarded, the idea
that our judgments are true or correct only if they correspond to
one fact or another, and the idea that wherever there is cognition
there must be some kind of cognitive substance or entity or organ
waiting to be causally reconciled with the physical world.
The distinction between internal and external norms of
evaluation can suggest that we must choose between the idea that
our uses of normative vocabulary are referential and descriptive
and the thought that when we evaluate behavior we project norms
onto an agent which could, in principle, also be made sense of
in non-normative terms. The authors of Sensorimotor Life make
ample use of this distinction:
What is the origin of these norms? If we are not speaking of
a self-individuating system, but one defined by convention, the
relevant norms are also given externally to the system (. . . ). Such
would be the case of a machine designed to perform a particular
purpose. What a machine “does” is thus evaluated normatively in
accordance with what the designer or the user expects of it. But it
is possible also to conceive of a concept of intrinsic norms (. . . ), a
concept not tied to the observer’s conventions and convenience.
Intrinsic normativity cannot be the result of observers making
judgments on behalf of the agent (. . .) (Di Paolo et al., 2017: 121;
see also 102–3 and 125)
2I’m thankful to Neftalí Villanueva for pressing me on several points, including
this one.
The contrast is highly intuitive. It can be at most
metaphorically illuminating to take a toaster’s environment
to be meaningful or dangerous for the toaster. It is bad for
the toaster to suffer a sudden power surge only in the sense
that the owner may have to buy a new one. Similarly, for “the
thermostat knows that it is below 21 degrees Celsius” or “the
printer refuses to speak to the computer,” being knowing and
speaking paradigmatic normative activities. There is something
unique and fundamental about entities that follow their own
norms, entities for whom it matters what they find in their
environment, which genuinely care about the opportunities and
resistances that the world provides for them and the way they act
with respect to them. The frog that fails to catch a single fly in a
forest where no one can observe her dies anyway.
In this sense, I cannot but agree with the idea that “intrinsic
normativity cannot be the result of observers making judgments.”
And yet, the idea of intrinsic normativity, as opposed to the
external norms imposed by the maker on an artifact, need not
be understood in descriptivist, nomological terms. It is because
the frog cares about catching flies, for her own good, that we
evaluate her action as more or less suited for the task (or the
environment as better or worse for her needs and goals) and not
the other way around.
But to think that such caring should be explained by appeal
to properties and facts about the frog is to remain within a
representational view of language and to invite a backlash of
reductionism and physicalism. Anyone who finds emergent
properties or possibilia mysterious and believes that every
explanatory enterprise is at bottom ontological would feel
forced to pursue conceptual frugality. If all our concepts aim
at referring to entities but there are only physical entities,
then we will have to eliminate most of our concepts (see
Pinedo García, 2016). In contrast, we can accept the existence
of a plurality of ineliminable explanatory approaches, some
mechanistic, some agential, intentional and normative (see
Pinedo García and Noble, 2008).
ONTOLOGY AND ETHICS
The worry I have been trying to express is that a descriptivist,
ontological reading of our explanations of agency in terms of
affordances and in terms of intrinsic norms may obscure the
evaluative dimension of such explanatory practices and, perhaps,
invite reductionist and eliminativist agendas that try to do
without the idea of a meaningful environment or a normative
encounter with it. Part of my concern has to do with what I
have called a residual representationalism regarding language.
My insistence on the fact that there is some inescapable ethical
and normative aspect in our approach to the living is shared
by many enactivists and ecological psychologists. For instance,
the authors of Linguistic Bodies are quite clear about the ethical
dimension related to meaning and intentionality, even in their
most basic forms:
(. . .) there is an ethical dimension (. . .) entailed by our theory
(. . .) [I]f living organisms are autonomous sense-makers that
behave in relation to vital norms, this implies that they are
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recipients of ethical concern. This must be reflected and not
occluded by the language we use to talk about them (Di Paolo
et al., 2018: 34).
Ethical concern is not something that is added to already
constituted linguistic bodies, as sociocultural normativity is
supposedly added to a presumed original nature in dualistic
thought (Ibid.: 310).
Perhaps an unavoidable, though unfortunate, consequence of
the still felt Cartesian influence is a tendency in the philosophy
of the cognitive sciences to play the “you are more dualist than I
am” game. But it may help to pause and see whether the game is
always played with the same rules or whether there is some basic
equivocation in the appeal to dualism. Unlike eliminativism,
which is better understood as a linguistic than as an ontological
thesis, being a dualist involves an ontological commitment with
the existence of things of radically different nature, in the extreme
case, so different that it is a mystery how they could causally relate
to one another. In contrast, to affirm that the language of, say, art
criticism or gastronomy cannot be replaced by the language of
molecular biology should not be seen as a dualistic statement. So,
inasmuch as dualism concerns what there is and not our ways
of making sense of it, dualistic thought, at a minimum, involves
taking norms, meanings or values to be entities and that’s where
the problems start. However, one can accept, wholeheartedly
and for normative and ethical reasons, the need to understand
living being’s interactions with their environment as meaningful
or significant without feeling the urge to populate the world
with meanings and values. We would be avoiding dualism at the
price of embracing a false dilemma: in one horn we would have
values and norms out there, either waiting to be found or merely
projected by the living, in the other, they would be just a manner
of speaking, a stance we can choose to take toward nature.
Both poles of this dilemma share a problematic premise: the
purpose of our explanatory vocabularies is to represent facts, so
either there are facts about meaning and value or our normative
practices are provisional shortcuts, ready to be discarded as
our knowledge develops. But factualism, interpretativism and
eliminativism can be all avoided if we recognize that there is a
lot more that we do with our words than representing, predicting
and controlling nature. This is where the best analytic philosophy
of language, from the early days, can still open up a space
that contemporary debates often ignore: Moore, Wittgenstein,
Ryle or Austin (who coined the expression “descriptive fallacy”,
see Austin, 1962/1979) all share this antidescriptivist approach
and it is depressing that so much contemporary philosophy of
mind seems to stem directly from ways of thinking that were
deeply challenged by these philosophers. My main purpose in
this paper has been to question that to oppose functionalism
in the philosophy of mind and cognitivism in psychology we
should share their ontological playfield and quarrel about what
there is. Our mundane values or our free-standing dispositional
affordances may be preferable to their representations and
computations, but we will be turning a debate that should focus
on the normative and ethical dignity of the living on a Cartesian
debate about measurable substances and attributes.
One of the consequences of this Cartesian heritage is the
disproportionate importance that the mind-body problem has
had in the philosophy of mind, especially in the analytic tradition,
but not exclusively. The mind-body problem is an ontological
problem and the different solutions that have been proposed are
descriptive: they try to establish what kind of entity a mind is
in order to account for its causal interaction with the physical
world. But this concentration on the mind-body distinction has
tended to hide a more important one, the distinction between
an agent and a thing, a distinction which is not so much
descriptive or ontological as normative or ethical (see Ramberg,
2000; Rorty, 2000). In his debate with Rorty, aptly situated under
the heading “post-ontological philosophy of mind,” Ramberg
insists on this point and attributes to Davidson a poignant form
of subversiveness against the philosophy of mind mainstream.
The same way that I have extended Wittgenstein’s thoughts
on normativity beyond language and society, I’d like to apply
Ramberg’s point to all forms of agency:
[T]he vocabulary of agency leaves us better off, better in the sense
of “politically more free.” I see Davidson as providing a tool,
a marginal tool (. . . ) in a struggle against the steady spread of
dehumanizing, homogenizing management of human existence
that is the real threat of scientism. Scientism is not bad, I am
sure Rorty would agree, because it gets the world wrong, or
even because it is a rehash of Kantian and Platonic ontology,
but because it renders us subject to certain forms of oppression
(Ramberg, 2000: 367).
The ethical concern brought about by agency-vocabulary is an
obstacle to treating living creatures, and us humans, as ownable
and controllable entities. But there is another desideratum,
besides avoiding a view of agents as mere things: not making
everything into an agent. Although our resistance to accepting
a normative treatment of non-social creatures (Heras-Escribano
et al., 2015) is now, to my eyes, misplaced (if we think that using
normative vocabulary is adopting a perspective that transcends
mere description and prediction and, hence, is not in the
business of following track to intrinsic properties of agents), it
was an overreaction to a genuine worry: the risk that we will
end up extending our normative nets to spheres where they
are not needed. In the past, we have expressed this worry by
pointing out that naturalizing normativity cannot be achieved by
normativizing nature on pains of a dangerous form of idealism
(Ibid.). To embrace the thought that there are areas beyond
human linguistic and institutional practices that should be
understood normatively should not make us think that there are
no important distinctions to be made, however, fuzzy the borders
may be, between prediction and control and understanding and
ethical concern. One of the strategies of oppressive power is
to present issues of value as factual and factual questions as
matters of opinion. The former can be found in the attempt
to put in technocratic hands decisions regarding public policies
(cf. Samuel Huntington’s advice to the trilateral commission: “to
employ the language of expertise more widely as a mechanism
to deal with the ‘excesses of democracy,”’ Stanley, 2015: 210)3.
3“Al Smith once remarked that “the only cure for the evils of democracy is more
democracy.” Our analysis suggests that applying that cure at the present time could
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and the latter in the efforts to muddle scientific consensus with
allegedly discording voices in cases such as climate change or the
connection between tobacco smoking and certain types of cancer.
If we suggest that everything is normative, some powerful tools of
political resistance may be lost.
I have assumed from the beginning that enactivism, ecological
psychology and the non-descriptivist and antirepresentationalist
strands of analytic philosophy share a commitment with the need
to start with the vocabulary of agency, of meaning and value, if
we are to do justice to life and cognition. But I believe that what
gives philosophical and ethical edge to this commitment may be
lost if we present ourselves as pursuing a project that competes
with standard, non-normative forms of approaching nature, as
merely offering richer redescriptions of a world that others may
try to describe with the vocabulary of the physical sciences. The
reduction of living beings to things, of value to price, of the sphere
of normative negotiation amongst legitimate options regarding
how to live to a technocratic calculus of benefits, are all equally
threatening consequences of blurring the distinction between
evaluation and description.
THE INESCAPABILITY OF THE
NORMATIVE DIMENSION
All attempts at explaining or understanding any kind of
phenomena have a normative nature. We can have better
and worse explanations, our understanding can be deeper
or shallower. Our explanations can be wrong and there is
always room for misunderstanding, whether we are dealing with
subatomic particles or with cultural practices. This is the simplest
argument in favor of the irreducibility and ineliminability of
our normative vocabulary: even the most purist reductionist and
eliminativist projects need to be evaluated. However, sometimes
the very subject matter of our explanations seems to need
tackling by using normative vocabulary. Is this just a convenient
stance, a provisional perspective that we adopt when we lack
the knowledge or the time needed to give a causal explanation,
grounded on laws rather than on norms? There are strong reasons
to doubt this. One of them is a consequence of the point I have
just highlighted regarding all of our explanatory practices: at the
very least, when we are interested in understanding nature our
activities are guided by norms, norms of coherence, of simplicity,
of empirical adequacy, of truth. . . But if some of our behavior
necessarily has to be seen as an instance of rules being followed
better or worse, correctly or incorrectly, the very idea that
normativity is a non-compulsory stance loses its strength and the
possibility, dear to some enactivists and ecological psychologists,
that acting, perceiving, in sum, being alive, is to be normatively
regulated becomes more attractive.
well be adding fuel to the flames. Instead, some of the problems of governance in
the United States today stem from an excess of democracy (. . . ). Needed, instead,
is a greater degree of moderation in democracy. (. . . ) First, democracy is only
one way of constituting authority (. . . ). In many situations the claims of expertise,
seniority, experience, and special talents may override the claims of democracy as
a way of constituting authority” (Crozier et al., 1975: 113).
Making sense of agency in terms of rules and norms,
of evaluations, of relationships of meaning and relevance, of
opportunities and dangers being properly or wrongly tackled,
cannot be a question of projecting a certain explanatory frame
into nature on pain of devoiding agents of their constitutive
normativity and reducing them to mere things, objects to
be controlled and possessed. But we should also avoid the
opposite temptation, the temptation of thinking of an agent as a
mechanism whose wheels should find the right preexisting rails,
as if sense, meaning and correctness were things that could be
understood in descriptive and nomological terms independently
of agents’ practices of making sense of the world. The danger of
putting too much emphasis on ontological matters is to lose sight
of what I have placed on the side of the ethical and normative:
that the intrinsically ethical dignity linked with being an agent is
not something we generously bestow on the living, but it is not
something we find in there by merely aiming at predicting nature
in order to control it (McDowell, 1984; Ramberg, 2000). The
problem that lurks behind the rails metaphor is that, besides the
danger of giving pride of place to an understanding of the world,
including the biological world, as something to be predicted,
controlled and, ultimately, owned by us, there is a different,
although related, menace behind the descriptivism I have been
warning against: to think that we are in the business of describing
normative facts when we approach agency could give us a sense
of entitlement to treat agents as mere things if we fail to discover
such facts. Hartry Field puts the point forcefully concerning
moral realism, but it can be extended to any version of factualism
regarding the normative:
Why make our policies conditional on our beliefs about the
existence and nature of normative facts? If we morally disapprove
of torturing dogs, why rest this disapproval on a pure belief
that there is a straightforward normative fact that we oughtn’t
torture dogs? Indeed, I’m tempted to say that the moral realist
has not only a dubious metaphysics, but also a dubious morality
that allows torturing dogs under the condition that there are no
straightforward moral facts, or under the condition that those
moral facts permit or even require such torture (Field, 2009: 270,
my italics).
The temptation which I fear concentration on ontological
matters brings is this: to avoid a subjectivist projectionism
according to which normativity is just a manner of speaking, we
want to say that agents follow their own norms independently
of whether we understand their behavior in terms of such
norms or not. But this should not lead us to think of criteria
of correctness and norms as transcending the contingent
activities and practices, either solitary or public, of agents.
My insistence on the ethical aspect of our normative
vocabularies is a way of highlighting the difference between
measuring the radioactive decay of a group of atoms and
explaining how plants communicate. We need to engage in
meaningful and communicative interactions to understand plant
communication, but we don’t need to be radioactive to explain
the behavior of Uranium-238.
Our distinction between the animate and the inanimate world
is, at the end of the day, a distinction between having an internal
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perspective and having an external perspective on things (or,
rather, between things that demand an internal perspective and
things that do not). Even practices that are fully alien to us, both
culturally and biologically, can only be understood if we grasp
what is it that the practitioners value, why do they care, what’s at
issue for them, how can they satisfy better or worse their needs
or preferences. In sum, why it makes sense for them to live their
life that way. Taking an internal perspective cannot amount to
sharing a way of living, at least not in most cases. But it must
involve recognizing it as a way of living and that implies going
beyond the ontological and into the ethical.
CONCLUSION
In this paper I have tried to offer an alternative to the
tendency, sometimes implicit, to think of normativity in
descriptive, ontological terms. To do so, I have brought back into
contemporary post-cognitivist debates some central ideas from
early analytic philosophy because I’m convinced that they target
forms of representationalism that have often remained invisible
and that have led to otherwise escapable dilemmas resulting
from a confusion between different explanatory projects. I have
pointed out as problematic some forms of descriptivism, which
I have identified as a form of local representationalism, and
claimed that blurring the distinction between placing something
within a causal, factual network and evaluating it or, in other
words, mixing up ontological and ethical matters, opens up
the door for an oppressive and objectivizing view of nature,
one according to which agents can be treated as mere things,
subject to prediction, control and ownership. To make normative,
evaluative matters depend on factual discoveries can lead to
inaction in situations that demand moral engagement.
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